For months, the United States has urged Iraqi leaders to craft a deal to disarm militias, even as U.S. troops face them down in the streets.
The decision to pull back from a confrontation with one key militia – on the orders of Iraq's prime minister – shows the depth of the power shift in Baghdad.
The United States may have had little choice Tuesday but to follow Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's order to dismantle roadblocks around the Mahdi militia's Baghdad stronghold of Sadr City, a sprawling Shiite slum of 2.5 million.
The Americans had few good options except trusting their Iraqi ally as the situation deteriorates.
The danger is clear, however: By allowing al-Maliki to appease Shiite members of his coalition who control dangerous militias – such as Mahdi army leader Muqtada al-Sadr – the United States could watch the country veer toward even sharper sectarian conflict.
The fear is that the armed Shiite death squads in Sadr City – which is named after the anti-U.S. cleric's slain father, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr – could increase their attacks against Sunnis across the capital.
At a minimum, removing the checkpoints may have led Sunnis to conclude that their rivals in the Shiite militia can act with impunity and with political cover at the highest levels.
If so, that could severely undercut the U.S. goal of strengthening a national unity government to stabilize Iraq.
It also could leave the U.S. military mission in limbo: U.S. officials are highly unlikely to keep U.S. troops aggressively patrolling Baghdad's streets against militia-run death squads if their hands are so tied that soldiers cannot act.
Top U.S. military officials deny that is happening, but many lower-level soldiers have complained of just such frustration in recent months.
The situation is complicated by next week's U.S. midterm elections, which have created uncertainty about whether U.S. policy will change.
Neither side has shed much light on whether Tuesday's turn of events was a case of al-Maliki forcing U.S. officials' hand, or a joint and orchestrated effort to boost al-Maliki's political stature with his Shiite partners, and thus help his efforts to curb militias.
U.S. officials said the prime minister's order was decided jointly at a meeting of al-Maliki, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Gen. George Casey, the top U.S. commander in Iraq.
But it also occurred in a week of sharp pushbacks by al-Maliki, including an earlier call for U.S. troops to pull back to their bases and out of Iraqi cities as fast as possible.
Aides to the prime minister have said flatly that he hopes to expand his authority by playing on U.S. voter discontent and White House reluctance to open a public fight just before the elections.
The United States – not al-Maliki – controls U.S. troops in Iraq.
But U.S. military and civilian officials say they are willing to compromise on military issues, and sometimes follow the prime minister's wishes, to aid the larger goal of helping him win an anti-militia deal.
In essence, they have decided his success is vital to theirs.
As an example, Casey said he ordered the release last month, at the prime minister's request, of one of al-Sadr's top lieutenants because it came just as al-Maliki was to hold delicate talks with al-Sadr.
The lieutenant had been arrested by U.S. troops for alleged links to militia death squads. There was no evidence the aide had been involved in attacks on Americans, Casey said.
“My assessment was, operational risk (from letting the aide go) was far exceeded by potential strategic payoff,” Casey said.
In the case of the disputed U.S. roadblocks, they were set up last week as part of an unsuccessful search for an abducted U.S. soldier, but al-Maliki's aides said they had actually worsened security.
